Chinese Christians' Global Mission
China's Boss Christians are reshaping Protestantism and twenty-first century geopolitics.
“God is rising here in China.” As 38-year-old Yao Hang gestures proudly round her Shanghai church, she remarks that its patriotic to be Christian. She’s not alone. China’s growing Protestant community is highly patriotic, and its mission is to fulfil the country’s economic dream. This peculiar brand of “sinicized Protestantism” has the power to reshape China’s relationship with the world.
Protestant Christianity is the fastest-growing faith in China, with more than 38 million followers, up from 22 million a decade ago. Under Mao Zedong, most Chinese Christians were poorly educated rural peasants. Following the arrival of Christianity in the seventh century by Syriac Nestorians and it’s spread by imperialist missionaries in the nineteenth century, the CCP regarded religion as a long-term phenomenon which could not be forcefully destroyed. This left cadres in rural areas where the party had less institutional control succumbing to local pressures and allowing the continuation of some Christianity. But today, more than 90% of those attending church are private individual business owners, executives, managers, and employees — the majority of whom are under 55 years-old.
A large number are based in the Eastern seaboard trade hub of Wenzhou, known as “China’s Jerusalem”, which is home to around one million Protestants and over 1,200 churches, and has a long history of migration. These commercially-savvy, outward-looking individuals have come to be fondly known as the “Boss Christians”.
The Boss Christian brand of Chinese Protestantism is built on patriotism, capitalist pursuits, and Christian teachings. Take Zheng Shangtao, a property developer and government committee member worth $400million. He believes that he serves God by making money: his consortium ‘Shenli Group’ translates as God’s power.
Indeed, Boss Christians faith is often measured in money. Zheng recounts that a boss of a major garment factory in Yueqing County was widely celebrated among local believers for a “public display of piety and wealth” after he announced he would contribute 1.5million yuan to building a new church.
Boss Christians believe they are being asked to manage wealth that belongs to God. Describing her work in the retail sector, another Boss Christian, who identified herself as ‘Yongnian’, explained that God sent a client to her. When experiencing business difficulties, she admitted that she had “forgotten about God”, wrongly believing success came from her own entrepreneurial skill.
“I’ve stolen from God blessings,” she said. “I thought it was because of my abilities to sell. Then it was hard to get the bill going. I’ve prayed confessing my sin and little by little I’ve finished selling all that was blocked in the store.”
Boss Christians don’t just have God to answer to; they must also answer to the Chinese Communist Party. For this reason, they have sought to alter Christian theology in a way that accommodates state ideology. They have rejected the standard metaphor of God as a father figure because in traditional Chinese culture the latter is ‘not associated with love and kindness’ and placed less emphasis on ideas of original sin. In contrast to western Christianity which believes that individuals are born with a corrupted nature, some Chinese socialists are influenced by the Confucian philosopher Mencius who argues that human nature is essentially good.
This bottom-up “sinicization” of Christian theology is driven by Boss Christians’ fervent patriotism. In Wenzhou, the hymns of Lu Xiaomin are commonly sung including the line, “If I had one breath left, I would dedicate it to China”. As the writer of over 1,800 hymns, Lu symbolises the rebirth of Chinese Christianity, with her work referred to as ‘God’s gift to China’.
It won’t be easy to win over the CCP. Xi Jinping has accelerated efforts to crack down on churches outside of state-approved religious organisations. In 2014 more than forty Wenzhou churches received notice that their crosses or buildings ‘must be demolished’. Last October the bishop of Wenzhou was arrested following his refusal to collaborate with approved Catholic organisations.
Yet, there are signs that the Party will permit certain religious movements that conform to state ideology. At the National Religious Work Conference, President Xi Jinping urged the church to guide religion to “adapt to socialist society” and help “realising the great rejuvenation of the nation”. As bastions of patriotism and economic enterprise, Boss Christians may escape a brutal crackdown.
Indeed, the Party may decide that Chinese Protestantism, like folk religion, is a useful political tool. To mark the birthday of the folk goddess Mazu, party officials in Fujian Province combined a traditional religious festival with a celebration of China’s economic growth. Government officials sat opposite Mazu statues as villagers clad in red tucked money into them — thus equating the worship of Mazu with support for the Party.
Chinese Protestantism could also help promote the Party’s interests beyond China’s borders. Boss Christians form a large part of Chinese migration to Europe as they continue to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities. Through recent emigration of Wenzhouese merchants to mainly France and Italy, Chinese Protestantism has found wings, with almost 70 Chinese churches constructed in Italy, and France housing 10,000 church members mostly in Paris.
A recent study concluded that the vast majority of Chinese immigrants in Europe come from Zhejiang Province, which includes the city of Wenzhou. Of the 600,000 Chinese migrants in France, up to 70% come from principally Wenzhou and Qigntian. Italy’s rapid growth in Chinese migrants from 60,000 to 330,000 between 2000 and 2011 can be explained by new arrivals from Wenzhou, while the city’s migrants form the majority of Greece’s Chinese population.
Chinese Christians living in Europe maintain close ties with their hometowns — sharing of preachers, religious ideas, and church donations. The largest migrant church in Paris, the Jidujiao Bali Wenzhou jiaohui, contributes 1,500 euros to every church building project in Wenzhou.
Characteristic of ‘Boss Christians’, the line between religious and economic activity is often blurred. Italian theologian Ottavio Palombaro has described how a small transnational clothing business was set up by three Chinese entrepreneurs, including one who lived in Milan, after connecting through a social media conversation about sacred scriptures.
Yet, Chinese churches are often isolated from wider European society. After migrating to Paris in the early 1990s, Brother Chen, head of the Parisian Wenzhou Church, still cannot speak French. When asked if he likes French food, he said he only likes McDonald’s. Boss Christians tend to marry each other, and have attacked French society for its “lax sexual morals” criticising divorce, homosexuality, and abortion. As a result, they rarely integrate into French mainstream society.
Not only do Boss Christians refuse to assimilate. They hope to spread their version of Christianity around the world, as China extends its global influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. A Chinese hymn called ‘God’s China Vision’ is regularly sung with its lyrics making clear their objective:
‘I walk forward to see China spread the Gospel to every corner of the world’.
The Chinese-led ‘Back to Jerusalem Movement’ epitomises these ambitions. At a meeting of international Christian entrepreneurs in Guangdong province, participants conducted collective prayers in front of a world map which showed the mission route from China to Jerusalem. Now, they believe, is China’s moment to evangelize Muslim nations in the Middle East and return the Gospel.
Similarly, Wenzhou emigrants in Italy are using public festivals to challenge the primacy of the western church. In 2018, the first major European public event for Chinese Christians was held. According to La Stampa, more than 20,000 Chinese Christians attended from across Italy, and a further 3,000 from other European countries.
The choice of location was part of Boss Christian attempts to signify the changing global balance of Christianity. Holding the event at the Circus Maximus, where Christians were persecuted by Emperor Nero, projected China’s spiritual leadership. The event’s organiser Ke Xinghai explained that many Europeans are “losing their Christianity, we wish to bring the Gospel not only to Chinese citizens but also to Europeans”.
Sub-Saharan Africa will make up 38% of world Christians by 2050 and is a key region in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. A Shanghai-based Bible Study group perceives God as “doing something amazing” through the Belt and Road Initiative in providing an opportunity for businesspeople to participate in a “global gospel advance”. It would not be surprising to see the entrepreneurial Wenzhou diaspora advancing their economic agendas in this part of the world as opportunities multiply.
David Aikman once speculated that upon becoming dominant within China, a Christian worldview could lead to warmer ties with the US. Instead, Chinese Protestantism has come to reflect the nationalist values of the Party — rather than serving as a destabilising Western force.
The Party will likely seek to benefit from this global network of patriotic Chinese Protestants. Yet, it needn’t form an official alliance. The Boss Christian agenda indirectly plays into China’s geopolitical interests by promoting Chinese values beyond its borders. The zealous missionaries are already challenging social norms outside China and are intent on spreading the word of God — and Xi Jinping — around the world.
I have found that China has had a peculiar relationship with Christianity during it's history. On one hand there is the anti-foreigner sentiments often associated with missionaries in the 19th century, but on the other hand it has formed the basis of some Chinese leaders like the Taiping rebels and Chiang Kai-shek.
Your last paragraph outlines my concerns that the CCP may use these churches and their international connections as a conduit for global influence operations.
This growing nationalistic superiority complex that the CCP are stirring up could cause tensions in international communities as they grow suspicious of each other due to the lack of social integration.